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OPINION OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Edison, New Jersey, Police Officer Daniel Bradley and 
his partner saw a minivan on the road at night without 
headlights, while its driver was using a mobile phone and had 
an obstructed view. They pulled over the van, driven by 
Donald Roberts, in which Appellee Theodore “Tyrone” Clark 
III was a passenger. The traffic stop lasted about 23 minutes 
from the time Officer Bradley arrived at the driver-side 
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window until he discovered a handgun and a marijuana 
cigarette on Clark.  
If the traffic stop was impermissibly extended to reach 
that point, however, any evidence seized after the stop should 
have ended may be suppressed per Rodriguez v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). The District Court decided 
that is the case here and the Government appeals, seeking 
admission of the handgun into evidence to support Clark’s 
indictment for unlawful possession of it. We agree with the 
Court that Bradley impermissibly extended the traffic stop 
after its mission was completed, and thus we affirm its grant 
of Clark’s motion to suppress. 
I.  Facts 
We derive the facts relevant to the traffic stop from a 
forensically enhanced audiovisual recording of it and the 
District Court’s undisputed factual findings. 
 The traffic stop here began routinely. Bradley asked to 
see Roberts’ license, registration, and proof of insurance. 
Roberts handed over the first two items, but he could not find 
the vehicle’s registration. Dashboard Camera Video (“DCV”) 
00:10:32–00:11:05. Bradley waited while Roberts searched 
for the registration. He said the vehicle belonged to his 
mother and offered to call her to ask the location of the 
registration. DCV 00:11:06–48. Bradley stated the stop was 
for three traffic violations and asked whether Roberts’ license 
was suspended; the response was no. Bradley inquired if the 
vehicle belonged to Roberts’ mother, and Roberts affirmed 
that it did. DCV 00:11:49–00:12:21. Bradley then went back 
to his patrol car with Roberts’ license and proof of insurance 
to run a computerized check of the vehicle’s registration 
based on the license plate number. DCV 00:12:22–30. His 
check revealed the license was valid, Roberts had a criminal 
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record for drug offenses, there were no outstanding warrants 
for his arrest, and the vehicle was registered to Kathy L. 
Roberts at the same New Brunswick address listed on Donald 
Roberts’ driver’s license. United States v. Clark, No. 16-449, 
2017 WL 3394326, at *1–2 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2017).   
 Bradley returned to the driver-side window and 
immediately asked Roberts about his criminal record, 
specifically, whether he had been arrested, for what kinds of 
crimes, and the date of his last arrest. He answered that he 
had been arrested for drug crimes, most recently in 2006. 
DCV 00:16:49–00:17:12. 
 Bradley then asked Roberts about his earlier 
whereabouts. He replied he was coming from his mother’s 
house. Bradley followed up by asking whether his mother’s 
house was in New Brunswick. Roberts did not answer, and 
instead said into his phone, on speakerphone, “Mom, you 
[sic] on a three-way.” Bradley asked again, and Roberts said 
into his phone, “He’s asking me questions about . . . what 
have I ever been arrested for, where have I ever been at, and 
I’m sitting here telling you that—I’m using you as 
confirmation—I just came from the QuickCheck and before 
the QuickCheck I was in . . . Plainfield.” DCV 00:17:13–42. 
Bradley asked a third time and Roberts responded that his 
address was in New Brunswick. Bradley then questioned if 
the vehicle belonged to his wife, and Roberts responded it 
belonged to his mother, his mother was the person on the 
phone, and she lived in Plainfield. Bradley noted that the 
vehicle was registered in New Brunswick, and the female 
voice on Roberts’ phone stated she did not change her address 
on the registration. DCV 00:17:43–00:18:06. 
 Roberts said the questions were confusing him and 
Bradley replied that he too was confused. He explained he 
asked the criminal history questions because, “[r]elevant to 
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being arrested, I’m trying to figure out where you were 
coming from. And I pulled up your history to see if you were 
lying to me.” He repeated the motor vehicle offenses he 
observed and said, “I’m trying to figure out where you’re 
coming from, that’s why I’m asking you these questions. I 
know your driver’s license and I know your history. That’s 
why I asked you—to confirm if you’re lying.” DCV 
00:18:07–00:19:24. Bradley then inquired if Roberts had any 
outstanding warrants for arrest or parking tickets, and Roberts 
explained he had just been released from prison and had no 
such issues. DCV 00:19:25–57. Bradley then queried how 
many times Roberts had been arrested. He answered, “What 
is that for?” whereupon Bradley asked him to step out of the 
vehicle. DCV 00:19:57–00:20:08. The two walked to the rear 
of the vehicle, and then Bradley again explained, “I’m asking 
you questions, most of them, I already know the answer 
to. . . . I told you why I stopped you, I ran your driver’s 
license, I ran for warrants, very simple, okay, that’s it.” DCV 
00:20:09–36.  
The conversation suddenly switched to a series of 
questions about Clark, including his name, how long they had 
known one another, and how they came to travel together. 
Roberts stated Clark’s name was Tyrone, he did not know his 
last name, they had not been friends for long, and he picked 
him up earlier that night in the Potters community in Edison 
Township. DCV 00:20:37–00:21:43. 
 Bradley approached the passenger’s side to question 
Clark, leaving Roberts by the rear of the vehicle watched by 
the other officer. He asked Clark the same questions he had 
just put to Roberts, to which Clark responded with his full 
name, that he had known Roberts for a long time, they were 
coming from Roberts’ mother’s house, and he stayed over at 
Roberts’ house in New Brunswick the previous night. DCV 
00:21:44–00:24:58. 
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 Bradley returned to Roberts, telling him that he and 
Clark gave a conflicting account, and questioned why he lied. 
Roberts denied lying and attempted to explain the route 
itinerary. Bradley said he smelled a strong odor of marijuana 
from the passenger’s side, but he did not smell anything from 
the driver’s side. DCV 00:24:59–00:28:50. He then asked 
Clark to get out of the vehicle because he intended to search 
it. The two officers told Clark to turn around for a pat-down. 
Clark complied and told them he had a handgun in his 
waistband. They removed a 0.357 caliber Smith and Wesson 
revolver, loaded with six rounds of ammunition, and a 
marijuana cigarette from Clark’s person. DCV 00:28:51–
00:34:00. 
 Clark was then taken into custody and Roberts was 
permitted to leave after the officers issued him a summons for 
the motor vehicle violations. Clark, 2017 WL 3394326, at *3. 
He did not receive any summons relating to the vehicle’s 
registration. Id. 
II.  Procedural History 
 A federal grand jury indicted Clark for possession of a 
weapon as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1).1 He moved to suppress the handgun seized from 
him during the traffic stop on the ground that the officers 
impermissibly prolonged the stop and any evidence recovered 
thereafter should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
                                              
1 State authorities also charged Clark with violating New 
Jersey law based on the same incident. He received a notice 
of parole violation, was remanded to East Jersey State Prison, 
and then had his parole revoked.  
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The District Court heard oral argument on the effect of 
Rodriguez on Clark’s claim. The Court noted that Clark 
conceded Bradley had reasonable suspicion to make the 
traffic stop, and the parties did not dispute that he developed a 
reasonable suspicion to continue to question Roberts and 
Clark at some point during the stop. Rather, they contested 
when the suspicion arose and whether the stop had been 
unconstitutionally prolonged to reach that point. No live 
testimony was given; the only evidence presented was the 
recording of the stop and motor vehicle records. 
The District Court granted Clark’s motion. Id. at *10. 
Its analysis focused on two issues: Was the criminal history 
questioning of Roberts within the scope of “ordinary 
inquiries” incident to a traffic stop (its purpose, referred to by 
Rodriguez as its “mission,” is “to address the traffic violation 
that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns,” 
135 S. Ct. at 1614 (citation omitted)), and did Bradley have 
reasonable suspicion during the stop to investigate other 
criminal matters? 
 
As to the former, the Court found that the 
computerized check of Roberts’ license, insurance, 
outstanding warrants, and criminal record, and of the validity 
of the vehicle’s registration and Roberts’ authority to drive, 
were permissible “ordinary inquiries,” as were the later 
questions about travel plans and route. Clark, 2017 WL 
3394326, at *7. The intervening questions about Roberts’ 
criminal history, however, were not. Id. Bradley already knew 
that information, and so the criminal history questions were 
not aimed at ascertaining it. Id. Nor did the Government 
suggest any connection between those questions and Roberts’ 
motor vehicle violations, road and traffic safety, or officer 
safety. Id. Rather, the Court decided that, after Bradley ran 
the computerized check, “there were no outstanding questions 
related to the traffic stop itself meriting further inquiry, and 
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the only step remaining to complete the stop was for Officer 
Bradley either to issue [a] summons for the motor vehicle 
violations or allow Roberts to leave with a warning.” Id. 
 
Turning to the latter question, the Court found Bradley 
did not acquire reasonable suspicion during the stop’s mission 
sufficient to prolong it, as his computerized check confirmed 
Roberts’ answers to his earlier questions. Id. at *9. Further, 
the Government did not contend, and the recording did not 
support, that Roberts’ behavior was suspicious or 
inappropriate. Id. Hence Bradley could not have formed a 
reasonable suspicion that justified investigation into other 
criminal activity. Id. 
 
The Government appeals the grant of Clark’s motion 
to suppress. It argues the Court committed legal error only as 
to the first inquiry: whether the criminal history questions 
were “off-mission.” It does not appeal the second part of the 
Court’s decision—that Bradley lacked reasonable suspicion 
to continue questioning after the computerized records check. 
 
III.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3731. We review de novo legal arguments 
challenging a suppression ruling, and we review factual 
findings for clear error. United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 
458 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Mixed questions of law 
and fact are subject to independent appellate review. Ornelas 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696–97 (1996).  
 
The Government bears the burden of showing (and 
presenting evidence) that the traffic stop was reasonable. 
United States v. Benoit, 730 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2002); 
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United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995). 
We view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to 
the District Court’s ruling, United States v. Cook, 277 F.3d 
82, 84 (1st Cir. 2002), and draw reasonable inferences in 
Clark’s favor, id.  
 
IV. Discussion 
 
 A traffic stop, even if brief and for a limited purpose, 
“constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of 
[the Fourth Amendment].” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806, 809–10 (1996). Though a stop may be lawful at its 
inception (as the parties agree is the case here), it could 
become “unreasonable,” and thus violate the Constitution’s 
proscription, at some later time. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405, 407 (2005). We review objectively the officer’s 
rationale, by looking to the facts and circumstances 
confronting him or her, to determine whether his or her 
actions during the stop were reasonable. United States v. 
Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397–98 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
The Supreme Court in Rodriguez directs our attention 
to the mission of the traffic stop to determine whether it is 
impermissibly lengthened.2 135 S. Ct. at 1614–16. A stop 
                                              
2 Though not relevant to the case before us, the Court also 
acknowledged its prior decisions that concluded “the Fourth 
Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that 
[do] not lengthen the roadside detention.” Rodriguez, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1614 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 
(2009) (“An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the 
. . . traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into 
something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those 
inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”).  
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becomes unlawful when it “last[s] . . . longer than is 
necessary” to complete its mission, the rationale being that 
the “[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the 
[mission] are[,] or reasonably should have been[,] 
completed.”3 Id. at 1614. To prolong a stop beyond that point, 
the officer must have acquired reasonable suspicion during 
the mission to justify further investigation. Id. at 1615. There 
is no de minimis exception to this rule.4 Id. at 1616.  
                                                                                                     
In United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2018), we 
noted in dicta the difficulty inherent in deciding when a 
traffic stop is “measurably extended.” Id. at 180. In that case, 
we ultimately assumed an officer’s traffic-stop mission ended 
after his initial conversation with the driver because after that 
point his actions were geared to rooting out a drug offense 
unrelated to the motor vehicle violation. Id. at 182. Though 
we too note our concern, that ambiguity is not at issue here 
because the Government does not contest that the criminal 
history questions prolonged the stop—it argues only that the 
questions were in fact related to the stop’s mission. See 
generally Appellant’s Br. at 13–28. 
 
3 The Court elaborated that “[t]he critical question  . . . is not 
whether the [inquiry] occurs before or after the officer issues 
a ticket, . . . but whether [it] prolongs . . . the stop.” 
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (quotation marks omitted). 
Thus the Government’s claim that the stop was not yet over 
because no tickets had been issued falls short. 
 
4 The Government’s argument that the brevity (20 seconds) of 
the criminal history questioning does not support it being off-
mission also fails given the Supreme Court’s explicit 
rejection of a de minimis exception in Rodriguez. 135 S. Ct. at 
1616. We note, however, this does not compel officers to 
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 To repeat, a traffic stop’s mission is “to address the 
traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related 
safety concerns.” Id. at 1614 (citation omitted). “Beyond 
determining whether to issue a traffic ticket,” this includes 
“ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” Id. at 1615 
(citation omitted) (alteration in original). These incidental 
inquiries typically involve checking the driver’s license and 
any outstanding warrants against the driver, as well as 
inspecting the vehicle’s registration and insurance. Id. They 
are considered part of the traffic stop’s mission because they 
serve its ultimate objective—to ensure roadway safety. Id. 
Tasks tied to officer safety are also part of the stop’s mission 
when done out of an interest to protect officers. Id. at 1616.  
 
 Not all inquiries during a traffic stop qualify as 
ordinarily incident to the stop’s mission. In particular, those 
“measure[s] aimed at detect[ing] evidence of ordinary 
criminal wrongdoing” do not pass muster. Id. at 1615 
(quotation mark omitted) (second alteration in original). “On-
scene investigation into other crimes . . . detours from th[e] 
mission,” as do “safety precautions taken . . . to facilitate such 
detours.” Id. at 1616. This is because “the Government’s 
endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in 
particular” is different in kind than roadway and officer safety 
interests. Id.  
 
Thus, considering objectively the circumstances and 
facts coloring the interaction, we must determine whether 
Bradley’s criminal history questioning, ostensibly aimed at 
                                                                                                     
move with the utmost expedience; the relative length or 
brevity of an inquiry does not bear on whether it was on- or 
off-mission. Id.  
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verifying Roberts’ authority to drive,5 was tied to the traffic 
stop’s mission, or instead whether the traffic stop must 
reasonably be seen as having been completed before that 
questioning began. Though Roberts was unable to find the 
vehicle’s registration, he told Bradley that the vehicle 
belonged to his mother and he offered to call her to help 
locate the registration. Bradley nonetheless asked Roberts 
whether the vehicle belonged to his mother, which he 
affirmed. Because Roberts was still unable to locate the 
registration card, Bradley ran a computerized check of the 
license plate to obtain that information. The information he 
obtained confirmed Roberts’ assertion—the vehicle was 
registered to a woman sharing his surname and residing at the 
same address listed on his driver’s license. The Government 
does not contend, and the recording does not support, that 
anything about Roberts’ behavior until that point fostered 
uncertainty about his authority to drive the vehicle. Though 
we can surely imagine other circumstances in which testing a 
driver’s candor about his authority to operate a vehicle—even 
by asking questions confirming his criminal history—would 
be a reasonable part of a traffic stop, that is not the case here. 
 
We agree with the District Court that, given the 
information confronting Bradley when he confirmed through 
the computerized check that Roberts was authorized to drive 
the vehicle, and when there was no fact calling that authority 
into doubt, Bradley no longer could have reasonably 
questioned it. Bradley’s inquiry into Roberts’ criminal history 
                                              
5 We do not decide whether Bradley’s actual motivation for 
asking Roberts about his criminal history was to determine 
his authority to drive. Even so, we note that, contrary to the 
Government’s suggestion, Appellant’s Br. at 11, 16, 23, the 
recording reveals that the officer did not explain to Roberts 
that he asked the questions for that purpose. 
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was thus not tied to the traffic stop’s mission, and, at that 
point, “tasks tied to the traffic infraction . . . reasonably 
should have been . . . completed.” Id. at 1614.  The questions 
therefore impermissibly extended the stop. 
 
Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, our holding 
does not “imagine some alternative means by which the 
objectives of the police might have been accomplished,” 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686–87 (1985), nor do 
we “require that the officer employ the least intrusive means 
conceivable in effectuating [the] traffic stop,” United States v. 
Hill, 852 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis omitted). Simply stated, we hold that, 
after Bradley’s computerized check confirmed Roberts’ 
authority to drive the vehicle and without any other indicia he 
lacked that authority, the traffic stop was effectively 
completed.6 To then turn to the passenger—Clark—for 
questioning that sought suspicion for criminal activity went 
beyond “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” 
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (citation omitted) (alteration in 
original). 
 
 Thus we affirm the District Court’s grant of Clark’s 
motion to suppress the handgun seized from him after the 
traffic-stop’s mission concluded. 
                                              
6 We do not reach the Government’s claim that the criminal 
history questions’ redundancy with the information obtained 
from the computerized check did not render them “off-
mission.” The District Court did not state their redundancy 
did so; rather, it stated they were redundant to explain their 
purpose was not to acquire criminal history information. 
Clark, 2017 WL 3394326, at *7. The Government does not 
contest this finding. 
